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ABSTRACT
Small businesses thrive in the developing economy of South Africa and address the important
issue of unemployment and poverty that exists in the country. A large number of these
businesses can be found in the province of Gauteng due to the large and diverse economic
contribution the province delivers to the economy of South Africa. With the increased use of
Information Systems (IS) by small businesses across the Gauteng province and in South
Africa generally, there is increasingly constant exposure to information security risks.
Interestingly, standards such as NISTIR 7621, specifically tailored to small businesses and
which could offer great insights on how to manage security risks, are by and large not
followed to the letter. We find in our work that owners-managers prefer to handle matters of
security ‘in their own terms’ and apply neutralization (termed rationalization) techniques to
overcome the effects posed by security threats. We used four instrumental cases for this
purpose. Our findings suggest that neutralization manifests as values held by ownersmanagers and this can often create the unintended consequences of exacerbating security risk
to these small businesses.
Keywords
Information Systems Security, Small businesses, Neutralization

INTRODUCTION
Small businesses thrive in the developing economy of South Africa and address the important
issue of unemployment and poverty that exists in the country. The South African National
Small Business Act 102 of 1996 identifies a small business organization as an entity that can
either be legally registered or not registered and is mainly focused on conducting small
business matters. If a small business is formally registered it would be likely that it employs
more than five people but less than 100, and will have a fixed business premises (Gauteng
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provincial government, 2010:7-8). A large number of small business organizations can be
found in the province of Gauteng owing to the large and diverse economic contribution the
province delivers to the economy of South Africa. Gauteng currently represents only 1.4% of
South Africa’s surface area but hosts around 23.7% of the country’s population, which is
close to 12.2 million people (SouthAfrica.info, 2012).
According to Stats SA’s census report (Stats SA, 2012), small businesses operate in
Gauteng’s three metropolitan municipalities namely: city of Johannesburg, city of Tshwane
and Ekurhuleni Metro, as well as two district municipalities, namely: Sedibeng and the West
Rand. These municipalities hold the following unemployment rates as shown in Table 1
below.
Table 1: Summary of Districts in Gauteng Province, South Africa (Stats SA, 2012)
Municipality

Type

Unemployment Rate 2011

City of Johannesburg

metropolitan

24.7% Unemployed

City of Tshwane

metropolitan

24.2% Unemployed

Ekurhuleni Metro

metropolitan

28.8% Unemployed

Sedibeng

district

32.0% Unemployed

West Rand

district

26.7% Unemployed

Between the periods of 1985 and 2005, only around 10% of the employment opportunities
were created by large established firms, showing the need to focus on the growth of small
businesses (SBP, 2009). In a study conducted on small businesses in the USA, it was found
that information technology could leverage the success of a small business, through better
services to the customer and also executing business processes more efficiently (Beheshti,
2004). Within the small business environment, information technology has been known to
“increase business efficiency and benefits as well as to make the organization more
competitive towards the outside business environment” (Baard and van den Berg, 2004).
Because of the increased cheaper broadband rates, (Grobler and Jansen van Vuuren, 2010) as
well as affordability of information systems (IS) technologies, many small South African
businesses are incorporating the use of information systems as part of their core processes
(Carkenord, 2009). This traction in IS diffusion has therefore resulted in many small South
African businesses increasingly becoming dependent on the use of IS. A crucial concern is
that the use of IS is coupled with inherent information and cyber-security risks that many
small businesses might not be aware of.
Many small South African businesses lack the proper mechanisms to control emergent cybersecurity risks and information systems security threats that characterize the use of these
technologies. This concern has been raised by researchers such as Grobler et al (2011:113)
who describe the digital space as a “dangerous place that poses a threat to the local
community” of South Africa. This knowledge is of great importance to researchers and small
businesses particularly towards understanding how risks are managed by owners-managers.
Since owners-managers are the primary decision makers on all matters pertaining to the dayto-day management and running of the small businesses, it follows then than a deeper insight
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on how they manage cyber-security risks is required. We note that the decision making
processes can often give rise to information security concerns because such decisions may
cause intentional or accidental security risks to these small businesses (D'Arcy, Hovav and
Galletta, 2009; Im and Baskerville 2005).
Frameworks for the right decision making process
Often the right decisions to be made by those who manage small businesses should be steered
by standards, policies and guidelines that would effectively make information more secure
and cyber-security risks less of a threat in these small businesses. Some of the decisions to be
made are (Yildirim et. al., 2011):
 acceptable security levels for user accounts
 frequency of passwords changing
 password complexity
 backing-up data
 access privileges
 confidentiality of information
Small businesses in South Africa are endowed with a few global standards, policies and
guidelines that would allow these small businesses to reinforce correct decisions such as the
above listed. The British Standard (BS) 7799, the ISO/IEC 17799 and Chapter XIII of the
Electronic Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act of South Africa are the most widely
used of these standards (Bougaardt and Kyobe, 2011). The Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) has also set up minimum provisions to
be followed by small businesses towards effecting proper controls over use of technology. In
2013, COSO updated and issued the Internal Control—Integrated Framework which
stipulates basic components of internal control that should be present in small businesses
(McNally, 2013). The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has equally
issued a guide specifically for small businesses to help them in their planning for security.
The NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7621, Small Business Information Security: The
Fundamentals, presents areas that small businesses should cover for their information
systems (Heier, 2014).
We contend that while the standards, policies and guidelines might be easily available, not
many small businesses are keen to follow these to the letter. Anecdotes suggest that many
owners-managers of small businesses rationalize why they would consciously disregard these
good tenets. This assertiveness can be termed neutralization and the next section elaborates
on this aspect further.
Neutralization
Li, Zhu and Pan (2012) have expressed concern that owners-managers of small businesses
lack enough skills to make the right decisions particularly in situations where problems occur.
They postulate that, most decisions made are subjective and are inherently biased. To cope
with emergent security threats that constantly affect the security of small businesses the
owners-managers will at times apply neutralization (termed rationalization) techniques that
assists in decision making. Neutralization theory proposes that individuals will rationalize
their decisions as acceptable and ‘ok’, irrespective of whether or not these decisions are
compliant with standards and guidelines (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Of concern to practitioners
of information security is that when owners-managers apply neutralization techniques and
rationalize on wrong decisions, these decisions might tend to intensify rather than mitigate
against information and cyber-security risks (Barlow, Warkentin, Ormond and Dennis, 2013).
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Research problem
Little is known about how neutralization techniques as operated by owners-managers of
South African small businesses are manifested. Little is also is known about the extent to
which these neutralization techniques and by extension standards, policies and guidelines are
adhered to. This work aims at filling this gap in literature by considering the impact
neutralization has on the security posture of small businesses in South Africa. The work
specifically applies concepts from the NIST Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7621, Small
Business Information Security: The Fundamentals, to conceptualize neutralization in these
small businesses.
Research questions
The objective of this research work is therefore to provide deep insights regarding how the
techniques of neutralization are used as decision-making aids by small businesses ownersmanagers in South Africa. In addressing the research objectives, the following are explicit
research questions that provide clarity on the research work:
1. how is neutralization manifested and made evident when owners-managers of small
businesses in Gauteng South Africa manage cyber-security threats?
2. how does neutralization impact the security posture of these small businesses?
3. how would neutralization be addressed in these contexts so that owners-managers are
better suited to manage cyber-security threats more effectively?
In an attempt to answer the above questions, we take a qualitative approach and focus on four
cases that were ideally selected because of the rich qualitative data that these cases offer. We
qualitatively examined the National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency
Report (NISTIR) 7621 for Small Businesses to understand how such a standard would be
neutralized by small businesses.
The rest of the sections are structured as follows:
the next section describes emergent cyber-security threats to small businesses and outlines
behavioral concerns espoused by owners-managers. What follows is a conceptual discourse
around the phenomenon of neutralization and its perceived influence on decision making in
small businesses. The theme is predominantly decisions made by owners-managers on the
need to mitigate against information systems security threats. The penultimate sections
consider the methodology used to obtain data, how this data was analyzed and finally a
discussion regarding findings is presented. The concluding section explains what these
findings mean to small businesses operating in South Africa.

CYBER-SECURITY THREATS TO SMALL BUSINESSES
Idrach (2011) has raised the question on whether small business’owners-managers have the
right attitude towards security. This is important considering that many small businesses do
not align security needs to business goals (Sangani, et al., 2012). Small businesses therefore
become exposed to threats and software vulnerabilities such as computer virus, malware,
phishing attacks and hacking that have a heavy financial bearing (Sangani, et al., 2012). The
main concern is that small businesses are largely dependent on information technology
investments which assist them to enhance and grow their business. Furthermore, while many
are keen to rush and utilize these emergent technologies, these small businesses often lack the
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necessary skills and awareness regarding standard procedures for mitigating information
security risks. Many small businesses do not necessarily understand risks and consequences
that may lead to security risks, and resulting financial implications (Idrach, 2011).
Many small businesses fail to consider information security because of a number of reasons
that include: “limited budget, limited time to invest in training and awareness, little
appreciation for risk and fewer compliance drivers”, Idrach, (2011:19). Information security
awareness from a small business owner-manager’s perspective often describes a condition
where the owner-manager recognizes the importance of information security as well as the
role they play in ensuring that information as a business asset is kept safe (Boucher and
Flowerday, 2011:2). Gaining knowledge and awareness regarding information security
threats is largely driven by the need to protect information systems and knowledge assets
against cyber-criminals.
In developing countries contexts, cyber-crimes and information systems risks have a greater
impact on business existence and survival, and is commonly seen as the result of a lack of
“law enforcement and expertise” (Salifu, 2008:440). Furnell, Gennatou and Dowland
(2002:352) note that information security is “critical” to “businesses that are technology
dependent” and conclude that this understanding is notably “lacking in small business
organizations”. While the lack of awareness about information security concerns especially
by small businesses may be a global problem, the effects are more pronounced in developing
countries such as South Africa (Salifu, 2008). In Gauteng, South Africa for instance, small
businesses lack the proper mechanisms to understand appropriate technologies such as
“antivirus or firewall software” and the possible cyber threats that exist. These businesses
encounter challenges when it comes to selecting the right technical security solutions from
the market because they lack the financial and/or technical capacity “to employ someone that
has a professional knowledge on cyber security” (Bhattacharya, 2011:302). Typically, many
small businesses have few if any at all IT professionals who manages the entire setup
(hardware, software and network needs) of the small business. According to Bhattacharya
(2011) many of these small businesses end up outsourcing most if it not all of their security
needs.
In a study focusing on small IS dependent businesses; , it was observed that awareness levels
were raised only through “an environment where mistakes were made and lessons learned”
(Furnell et al., 2002:354). Further studies on the small business environment of South Africa
indicated that many had not adopted formal information security and awareness frameworks
as well as frameworks that deal with privacy and protection of personal identifiable
information (Upfold and Sewry, 2005). Additionally, many of these businesses were not even
aware that these threats existed (Perks, 2010). Since security and privacy had not been the
prime concern of many small businesses, many were operating under the notion that by just
installing an anti-virus software “[the software] would take care of all security threats”
(Sangani and Vijayakumar, 2012). With such lack of awareness and training levels noted, it
is surprising that many small businesses still flourish amidst emergent and often turbulent
cyber environments. The next section discusses how lack of awareness regarding security
matters is an antecedent to neutralizsation.
Neutralization and bounded values
Although, it can be agreed that owners-managers are actively involved in the day-to-day
management of small businesses in Gauteng, there is an increasing need for these to perform
security related decisions such as installing anti-virus software, avoiding questionable emails
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(phishing emails) and encouraging the use of strong passwords in their small businesses
(Barlow, et al., 2013). Results from a South African study emphasized the need for the
presence of information security awareness in business organizations as well as the
importance of a ‘localized approach’ to the needs of the business (Thomson, 2008).
The greatest threat regarding security in small businesses is the owners-managers and the
security decisions they make (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). Small businesses would be
exposed to security risks if owners-managers made security related decisions that are
accidental or out of volition causing threat to data. This can be rationalized (termed
neutralization) for instance when they perceive security procedures as hindrance to their job
performance. Neutralization techniques as elements of cognition would be employed to
rationalize non-compliance of policy with statements such as “we really don’t need strong
passwords, we are a small company”. Indeed negligence in security compliance represents
over 40% of information security related incidents in the U.S. and U.K. (Ponemon Institute,
2013).
The theory of neutralization techniques which originated from psychology studies considers
several types of neutralization (rationalization) that explains non-compliant decisions (Sykes
and Matza, 1957). Neutralization has been applied in information systems security policy
research by Siponen and Vance (2010). Studies confirm that neutralization is an important
predictor to non-compliance (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). According to D’Archy et al.,
(2009), lack of awareness has been shown to be an important measure towards increasing
non-compliance regarding security. It should be noted that the non-compliance would be an
outcome of lack of awareness and not necessarily by choice.
We consider that neutralization is more often than not the primary cause of non-compliance
or ‘costly mistakes’ in security matters by small businesses. It follows therefore that our
research was an attempt to understand awareness (or lack thereof), and how this influenced
the kinds of neutralization techniques employed by owner-managers of small businesses
across Gauteng province in South Africa. The next section elaborates on the method used to
understand the phenomenon of neutralization in small businesses across Gauteng, South
Africa.

METHODOLOGY
In order to understand the phenomenon of neutralization in small businesses across Gauteng,
South Africa we used a qualitative research approach. Qualitative research works towards
“describing the quality of a phenomenon” (such as in our case, neutralization) instead of
necessarily answering questions regarding the phenomenon statistically and numerically
(Blumberg et al., 2008:192). Qualitative management research is difficult to define in a single
manner and has to be specifically tailored to its intended research environment (Johnson,
Buehring, Cassell and Symon, 2007:37).
The benefit of a qualitative research approach to this work is twofold:
-first, it will allow the researchers to “see and understand the context within which decisions
and actions take place” (Myers, 2013:5),
-second, it provides an opportunity for practice to gain insights on the relatively newness of
the “sociological and psychological” aspects of neutralization within small businesses
(Blumberg et al., 2008:192). One feature of the qualitative approach that the researchers also
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found important is that this approach constituted an empirical investigation that had to
primarily rely on empirical data from the social world.
We contend that it would have been impossible to understand why owners-managers of
small businesses did what they did and why something happened without first talking to them
and obtaining empirical data (Myers, 2013). According to Myers (2013), qualitative research
in this instance would have been the best approach to use since we would be researching the
phenomenon of neutralizsation in-depth. It is for this reason that we studied four
organizations that were dependent on IS within the Gauteng region in South Africa where
neutralization would be studied in context. These four cases were selected because of the rich
insights each would yield. The interpretivism stance was adopted in order to understand
“meaning and the individualized ways of living by owners-mangers” (Beck, 1992). The use
of subjectivism and interpretivism fit well with the qualitative research study.
Case selection
Using criterion based, critical case sampling, (Turner, 2010:757) we first developed an
instrument called the ‘Information-Technology-Dependency tool’ which was distributed
across ten randomly selected businesses. Small businesses owners-managers were asked
(using structured questionnaires) how dependent they were regarding the use of IT solutions
and how IT was supporting core processes (Blumberg et al., 2008:253). This criterion then
informed us on the choice of determining the most appropriate case. We narrowed down to
four cases that adhered to the set criterion (Saunders et al., 2009:240).
Procedure
Non-standardized, semi-structured interviews were used to gather the primary empirical data.
This was useful in helping the interviewees ‘to stay on topic’ (Saunders et al., 2009:360-371).
During these interviews, we made use of techniques such as the Kruger, Drevin and Steyn,
(2010) “vocabulary test” or “consensus ranking”, which enabled the understanding of
information security awareness of interviewees and the phenomenon of neutralization. Data
from the interviews enabled us to prioritize the different aspects of information security
awareness exhibited by owners-managers of small-businesses (Kruger and Kearney,
2008:255). The most relevant IT person in the small business (mostly identified as the ownermanager) was selected for the interview (Tsohou, Kokolakis, Karyda and Kiountouzis,
2008:330). The themes identified for interviews (drawn from the literature review) included
the interviewees understanding and mitigating security efforts regarding
(i) security of information and technology as part of the business and access controls,
(ii) information and technology failures resulting from poor back-up procedures,
(iii) complexity of passwords,
(iv) control of personal information and phishing emails, and finally,
(v), anti-virus, and anti-malware solutions existing in their small business.
Background Cases
Organization 1: Finance and Business services
This organization specializes in offering payroll and tax-related services to small businesses.
Organization 1 is based on a partnership business structure. The organization has six
permanent employees and two other employees on a contract basis. The co-owners of this
small business organization indicated that the organization makes use of information
technology on a regular basis and is heavily dependent on IT for core processes. When
describing its everyday business processes and activities, it was noted that IT forms a large
part of the company and how it makes its revenue. The two business partners that co-own
this organization were interviewed.
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Organization 2: Retail and Motor Trade and Repair services
This organization specializes in the trade and repair of second-hand vehicles and is a leader
within its operating market in Gauteng. The business has a single owner along with a number
of management staff. Organization 2 employs around 45- 50 workers, which classifies it as a
small business according to the National Small Business Act of 1996. An analysis of data
generated from the IT-dependency tool confirmed that this specific organization made use of
IT regularly. The analysis further confirmed that IT has created competitive advantage for the
business. The small business owner-manager was interviewed.
Organization 3: Finance and business services
Organization 3 is a small auditing firm that has a relatively large client base in the Gauteng
province. The organization generates and makes use of personal and sensitive information on
a daily basis. An analysis of the IT-dependency tool confirmed dependency on IT for core
processes within this small business. The processing of financial, tax and other personal and
sensitive information was done using technology systems and this formed part of the daily
business activities. Both the partner and owner of the auditing firm were interviewed.

Organization 4: Finance and business services
This organization employs 15 people and operates in the advertising industry of Gauteng, as
well as the rest of Africa. The senior manager of the small organization suggested that IT was
incorporated into daily operations particularly in market research. Some of the services
rendered by this small business were anchored on e-commerce technology with a sizable
number of other business processes being supported by integrated network technologies. It
was also noted that a big portion of the small business revenue was earned through
technology based operations that included e-commerce and online advertising. The senior
manager, who reports directly to the owner of the business, was interviewed.
Narrative: IS/IT dependency
Interviewees from the four cases selected from Gauteng, South Africa confirmed the use of
common operating systems and software applications such as MicrosoftTM and Microsoft
OfficeTM related products within their small businesses. PastelTM was the most commonly
mentioned software package used by these small organizsations. Two interviewees
mentioned VIPTM as the preferred payroll solution. An interviewee from organizsation 1
explained that PastellTM and VIP PayrollTM were used in conjunction with online banking
applications. The interviewee from organization 3 confirmed that their small organization
used accounting CasewareTM, PastelTM and Pastel PayrollTM. Outside of the reliance of
vendor-based software, an interviewee from organization 2 specified that their small
organization also made use of customized software applications that were tailored to their
own specific business needs. Both interviewees from organizations 2 and 4 also confirmed
the use of MicrosoftTM and PastellTM.
The interviewee (owner-manager) from organization 2 expressed the dependency of this
tailored software:
“Software that is specifically written in-house [means] everything [to us]!”
“Our entire business is dependent on information technology! From sales to
marketing to client communications.”
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The interviewees were unanimous that information technology had brought changes to how
they ordinarily run their businesses. Asked whether they supported these changes, the
interviewees affirmed:
“yes definitely”; and
“we really support the change information technology brings to the business.”
Interviewees also expressed concern that such dependency and use of technology also
brought unintended consequences, such as disruptions, data integration and/or
interoperability issues. An interviewee from organization 1 illustrated one such process
failure as being attributed to a ‘compatibility’ issue that was not anticipated:
“…exactly what happened today… I will introduce a certain program and maybe it’s
a newer version and then it’s not compatible to old versions….”
Narrative: How Neutralization was occurring
An interviewee from organization 2 gave the example of a backup that was not made for two
months, and when a failure occurred, the small business lost two months of work. The failure
and loss of business information was devastating to the organization with the interviewee
(business owner) stating that the business had not been able to fully recover since that
occurrence. Some of the interviewees’ responses were as follows:
“I don’t want to tell you how much two months is in this company! We service over
300 cars a month. It was a nightmare!”
“I lost everything! [I’ll] never be able to catch-up on everything…!”
The interviewee described a scenario where a failure in business IT happened because of an
accidental damage to the backup disk. This was brought about by careless handling, as
explained below:
“My clerk dropped [the] back up [disk]! Now I cannot restore it and the data is lost!”
The loss of information caused disruption to the business. The interviewee (owner-manager)
further explained how this lost information was crucial to the trading and repairing of motor
vehicles. Dependency of information technology in the small business was again emphasized
in this instance.
We observed that these small organizations were primarily dependent on third parties such as
banks to provide assurance and guarantees on matters pertaining to information security.
There wasn’t any observable indication that these small organizations were proactive in the
security of information. An interviewee from organization 1 explained that they were
satisfied with the way the online banking authentication codes were changed on a monthly
basis:
“Our codes change every month, you change your codes and there is two sets of
codes to change, and there is approval that you have to do.”
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One way of avoiding the responsibility of securing their systems when using the internet for
online banking transactions, as explained by an interviewee from organization 3, was that of
restricting the online banking process or doing away with it entirely:
“ restricting access to the online banking [because] enough comfort exists over the
possible risks”.
On matters pertaining to phishing threats, one of the interviewees (co-owner) from
organization 1 gave a specific example of a phishing related request that the small business
had experienced in the past. The participant acknowledged not responding to this specific
request, since this was identified as not being genuine. The interviewee explained:
“I received one this week from somebody stating [that] you must reply and contact
the bank because there is a check paid into your account [which] has not been
cleared. I went into my bank account and saw that there is no other money that I know
about...”
The interviewee from organization 2 (owner) explained that he occasionally enforced
awareness amongst his employees on matters pertaining to phishing:
“If I get something like that I remind the employees not to respond…”
An interviewee from organization 1 confirmed that employees were made aware of the
dangers of phishing emails. However, this, as he seemed to suggest, was made verbally:
“I just said to them, ignore it!”
Interestingly, interviewees from organizations 4 and 5 suggested that they were unaware of
policies that existed in their organizations on mitigating against risks of phishing. An
interviewee from organization 3 pointed this out. Prodded on the dangers of phishing, the
interviewee’s response was:
“If the employees click on the links [on the email], it’s their own problems. Then it
would be their work that is affected…I haven’t spoken to them about it and if they are
stupid enough to fall for it they have to learn from it...”
An interviewee from organization 3 confirmed that business and customer information was
stored on any available device including individual laptops, backup drives, hard-copy files
and other information storage mediums:
“There is no specific place, it’s mostly company information and we store it
everywhere.”
The same interviewee (organization 3 owner) also stated that the small business had restricted
access to hard-copy personal and sensitive information. Such information was kept locked in
filing cabinets. Conversely, electronically available information was accessible to all the
employees. :
“…everybody has access to the information…the business is so small so everybody
that works here [and needs] the information every day [gets it]… In a bigger business
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I guess there would be a risk… personal information of the employees is stored in my
office...”
An interviewee from organization 3 even suggested that they do not enforce access and
confidentiality policies. When queried about slackness in attitude towards controls, an
employee from organization 1 responded:
“We started with passwords on individual computers, but I asked them to remove
them because it’s just a nuisance.”
Interviewees from organizations 1, 2 and 3 confirmed that access to servers they had was
restricted by passwords. Interestingly, only one of the small organizations sampled
consistently enforced the use of passwords on employee computers.
On matters concerning the use of illegal and unauthorized software use, an interviewee from
organization 2 suggested an interesting approach he employed to deter this practice:
“We have nothing as such! I’ll [… ] someone if he does that.”
This interviewee acknowledged having certain blind-spots concerning activities his
employees performed on their work computers:
“…If you ask me… if my employees are doing things on their computers, how would I
know? I don’t always look at their things; I don’t know what they do on their
computers… I’m sure if they are downloading illegal stuff my IT-guy would pick it
up...”
Most interviewees claimed to have legal up-to-date software, with the exception of the
interviewee from organization 3 (owner) who revealed that the software they used on the
premise had in fact expired:
“Yes [we have] but it’s outdated. Mine is expired and I have to get it updated.”
It was interesting that although the small organization was using an expired software, this did
not seem to constitute such a big deal for the owner.
Matters concerning physical security of organizations’ assets were also raised. When one
interviewee from organization 2 was asked whether an encounter on physical security
breaches had ever been experienced, the owner-manager responded:
“…we’ve been lucky; no one has ever broken in and stolen our computers
and other equipment.”
“…we are extremely lucky...”
The owner-manager confirmed that while, there had never been a known incident regarding
the theft of information technology, the small business did not necessarily feel that it was
adequately protected.
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Based on this narrative data, we embarked on a deeper analysis using formally established
analysis and coding methods. The next section elaborates on how we coded and interpreted
the above narratives.
Coding
Elements on the above narratives “identified as meaningful” were coded for deeper meaning
by “a reconstruction of life’s construction” (Harper, 1998). We recorded the direct quotes
(verbatim) and ascribed them numbers. We then analyzed the rationalization and meaning
behind what was said by owners-managers. This was also recorded. We examined these
comments against established security tenets in an attempt to assess underlying awareness
levels that these owners-managers presented. We thoughtfully consider these comments to in
an attempt to understand neutralization as a technique used towards mitigating security
threats. We used the sequence of understanding of neutralization as described by Denzin
(1989:46) as follows:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

securing the interactional text (that exemplified neutralisation)
displaying the text as unit
subdividing the text into key experiential units
linguistic and interpretive analysis of each unit
serial unfolding and interpretation of meaning of the text to participants
development of working interpretation
confirming meaning against text
grasping text as a totality
displaying multiple interpretation that occur within text.

By following Denzin (1989) procedure for interpretations we highlighted the most significant
problem representation/framing that was acutely different from acceptable treatment of
security, and flagged these as ‘experiential units’ to be considered. We established over 75
experiential units. The experiential units (which best exemplified neutralization) were risk
assessed and mapped against the following risk elements:
(i) impact to profits,
(ii) impact to reputation,
(iii) impact to litigation, and
(iv) impact to business continuity.
We present the selected experiential units and interpretation shown by Table 2 below.
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Table 2: Interpretation of Experiential Units of Neutralization by owner-managers of small businesses

#23

#25

#31

“I lost everything! [I’ll] never be
able to catch-up on everything!”

Regular
Back-up

Decided not to
back up

“My clerk dropped [the] back up
[disk]! Now I cannot restore and
the data is lost!”
“Our codes [passwords] change
every month, you change your
codes [passwords] and there is
two sets of codes [passwords] to
change, and there is approval that
you have to do.”

Ensure
Password
complexity

Decided
that
Passwords and
approvals were
disruptive

Researcher’s Memo: Development of working interpretation
Interpretation

Lack of proper
disaster recovery
procedures and
business
continuity
procedures
Section 2.5 of
NISTIR 7621
Lack of standard
access
control
procedures

Risk Measure
E = Extreme Risk
H = High Risk
M= Moderate Risk
L = Low risk

Impact to Business
continuity

Neutralization
by
ownermanager: What
was
actuality
done

Impact to
Litigation

Text subdivided as key experiential
unit (Denzin, 1989)

Security
tenet to have
been followed

Impact to
Reputation

Rationalization :

Impact to Profits

Experiential
unit #

E

M

Section 2.9 of
NISTIR 7621

#33
“We started with passwords on
individual computers, but I asked
them to remove it because it’s just
a nuisance.”

# 38

“We [are] restricting access to
the online banking”; [because]
enough comfort exists over the
possible risks”.

Ensure
Secure
Online
banking

Decided
eliminate
process
altogether

to
this

Lack of online
banking
preparedness
Section 3.4 of
NISTIR 7621

M
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#52

“If the employees click on the links
[on the email], it’s their own
problems. Then it would be their
work that is affected.”

Neutralization
by
ownermanager: What
was
actuality
done

Develop
Policy
Phishing

Decided
eliminate
process
altogether

on

to
this

#56
“I haven’t spoken to them about it
and if they are stupid enough to
fall for it they have to learn from
it.”
#59

“There is no specific place, it’s
mostly company information and
we store it everywhere.”

#60

#66

“…In a bigger business I guess
there would be a risk… personal
information of the employees is
stored in my office...”
“…everybody has access to the
information…the business is so
small so everybody that works
here [and needs] the information
every day [gets it]…

Develop
Policy
regarding
storing
of
personal data

Develop
categories of
Information
Access
control

No
specified
policy

The lack of
classification on
information
access control

Researcher’s Memo: Development of working interpretation
Interpretation

Lack of an effect
policy
creates
poor framing /
representation of
problem
for
phishing

Section 2.8,3.1 of
NISTIR 7621
Lack of awareness
results
poor
framing
/
representation of
problem
Section 2.10 of
NISTIR 7621
Lack of awareness
results
poor
framing
/
representation of
problem
Section 2.6 of
NISTIR 7621

Risk Measure
E = Extreme Risk
H = High Risk
M= Moderate Risk
L = Low risk

Impact to Business
continuity

Text subdivided as key experiential
unit (Denzin, 1989)

Security
tenet to have
been followed

Impact to
Litigation

Rationalization :

Impact to
Reputation

Experiential
unit #
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Impact to Profits
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We used ATLAS.tiTM software to establish the major concerns (concepts derived from selected
experiential units) that faced owners-managers of small businesses when they tackled information
security issued. By using a hermeneutical interpretative approach, we established six key themes,
categorized from experiential units that were the essential components for understanding neutralization
of well understood security tenets. They were back-up of data, password complexity, online banking,
policy on phishing, storage of personal data and access control.
DISCUSSION AND RESEARCHERS INTERPRETATION: ‘WHY WE WANT TO DO IT OUT
WAY’
The interpretation is structured on the six themes outlined above. The six themes are interpreted using
NISTIR 7621 as a guide and in accordance to what Barrett and Walsham (2004) cite as ‘positioning as
translating interests’. This means that the interpretive work could make a contribution if there is
acceptance of our knowledge claims on neutralization. The basis of our interpretation is our assumption
that owners-managers were creating and associating their own subjective meaning of security of systems
unaware of what NISTIR 6721 was suggesting (Walsham, 1995). Therefore, we embarked on a deep and
systematic interpretation of the six themes using NISTIR 6721 so that the insights produced by the
interpretation in each theme could be generalized (Walsham 1995).
The interpretation section that follows attempts to answer the first research question regarding how
neutralization is manifested and made evident when owners-managers of small businesses in Gauteng
South Africa address cyber-security threats. It also explains in the following paragraph the impact of
neutralization on the security posture of these small businesses which was the second research question.
Back-up and Storage
The issue of backing up data is closely related to how well small businesses plan for and survive during
times of disaster. We observed deficiencies in planning for such an event. The following statement
supports this:
“I lost everything! [I’ll] never be able to catch-up on everything!” and “My clerk dropped [the]
back up [disk]! Now I cannot restore it and the data is lost!”
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Back-up and Storage
Section 2.5 of the NISTIR 7621, recommends that it is essential that small businesses back-up data on
each computer used in the business. It was clear that from the cases selected, not much importance was
attached to this procedure. It might have been that the probability of a disaster such as this happening
[losing of data] was minimal and this expectation tended to neutralize the need to back-up data as
recommended. In terms of appropriating a measure for risk we interpreted and assigned this
neutralization as E = extreme risk. This is shown by Table 2 above. This means the adopted
neutralization would possibly have a big impact to profits, to reputation, to litigation and to business
continuity.
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Password use and complexity
When the use of passwords in small businesses was considered, neutralization manifested with
statements such as:
“We started with passwords on individual computers, but I asked them to remove it because it’s
just a nuisance.”
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Password use and complexity
Section 2.9 of the NISTIR 7621 recommends the use of passwords in small businesses as an “absolute
necessity”. The standard proposes that each small business should “set up a separate account for each
individual and require that good passwords be used for each account”. It further recommends that good
passwords should consist “of a random sequence of letters, numbers, and special characters and at least
8 characters long”. The standard asserts that employees should not have administrative accounts.
Our interpretation is that the owners-managers neutralized this requirement by requesting passwords to
be removed from this specific organization, this created risk to the small business. In terms of
appropriating a measure for risk, we interpreted and assigned this neutralization as M = moderate risk.
This is shown by Table 2 above. This means the adopted neutralization may have a moderate impact to
profits and to reputation.
Secure Online Banking
We noted that small business owners had an inconsistent understanding of security threats when using
online banking. The belief that there were ‘no risk concerns’ was dominant. There was no indication that
the small businesses were proactive in addressing their own security needs. An interviewee from case 1
explained that they were content with the way the online banking authentication codes (passwords) were
changed on a monthly basis:
“We [are] restricting access to the online banking” [because] enough comfort exists over
the possible risks”.
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Online Banking
NISTIR 7621 section 3.4 has issued provisions on the best way that small businesses can conduct online
business and banking more securely. This section stipulates that it is necessary for small businesses to
use a secure browser connection (indicated by a small lock visible on the lower corner of web browser).
It also recommends that the “web browser cache, temporary Internet files, cookies, and history
associated with online commerce or banking sessions should be erased after the end of the sessions (p.
9)”. This would “prevent sensitive information from being stolen by a hacker or by a malware program,
if the system has been compromised”.
To the small businesses, it was more convenient to “restrict access to the online banking”, entirely than
to appropriate the necessary controls. This neutralization effectively shut down and eliminated such a
process altogether. This showed a lack of online banking preparedness. Our interpretation for this
neutralization was that although shutting down the entire process seemed to have been rationalized as a
less risky approach, small businesses were deprived of the opportunity to benefit from the advantages
such a technology yields. In terms of appropriating a measure for risk we interpreted and assigned this
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neutralization as L = Low risk, this is shown by Table 2 above. This means the adopted neutralization
will have a moderate impact on profits.
Phishing
Owners-managers neutralized phishing policies with statements like:
“I haven’t spoken to them about it and if they are stupid enough to fall for it they have to learn
from it.”
Findings suggests that although the term phishing was not always known, owners-managers were able
to articulate with clear examples (commonly Nigerian 419 email scams) of phishing related incidents
that had occurred in their small businesses.
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Phishing
Section 2.8 of the NISTIR 7621 is quite clear on how employees should be trained on security
principles. It is simply not enough to tell employees “if they are stupid enough to fall for it they have to
learn from it.” The standard encourages owners-managers of small businesses to train “employees who
use any computer program containing sensitive information”, and that the employees should be taught
how “to properly use and protect that information”. Moreover, Section 3.1 of NISTIR 7621 is very
specific on security standards to be adhered to regarding emails requesting sensitive information. The
standard suggests that “beware of emails which ask for sensitive personal or financial information –
regardless of who the email appears to be from. No responsible business will ask for sensitive
information in an email”.
We noted that owners-managers did not have enough understanding to consider phishing as a bigenough risk that would require formal training. The suggestion that “they had to learn from it”
neutralized this tenet. In terms of appropriating a measure for risk we interpreted and assigned this
neutralization as H = high risk, this is shown by Table 2 above. This means that the adopted
neutralization may have a high impact to reputation and litigation.
Storage of Personal Data
From the interviews held, it emerged that there was a less rigid approach towards keeping personal data
safe. Statements such as the one below from interviewee from organization 3 confirms this:
“There is no specific place, it’s mostly company information and we store it everywhere.”
Although, restricting access to information seemed to have been fundamentally understood by the small
business organizations, but beyond this, diminutive initiatives existed to follow accepted standards and
guidelines. Phrases such as “…everybody has access to the information…the business is so small”
tended to neutralize the possibility of securing personal information.
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Storage of Personal Data
On the issue of personal data and privacy, Section 2.10 of the NISTIR 7621 suggests that it is good
practice to protect information from employees. The standard recommends that small businesses should
“not provide all data to any employee” and that the employee should not have access “to all systems,
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(for instance, financial, personnel, inventory, manufacturing, etc.)”. The standard is clear: employees
should only have information that is needed to do their jobs.
Minimal compliance with this provision was noted to be evident. From the owners-managers point of
view, and how they rationalized this was that it would have been difficult to adhere to Section 2.10 of
the NISTIR. In terms of appropriating a measure for risk we interpreted and assigned this neutralization
as H = high risk, this is shown by Table 2. This means the adopted neutralization will possibly have an
impact on profits and reputation. Consequently, risk of litigation might also be possibly high.
Access control
It emerged from the interview sessions that the small businesses had a less rigid approach towards
how anyone and everyone was accessing company records. An interviewee from organization 3
pointed out that:
“…everybody has access to the information…the business is so small so everybody that works
here [and needs] the information every day [gets it]… “
Researchers’ interpretation regarding Access control
Section 2.6 of the NISTIR 7621 has provided a standard for how small businesses should control
physical access to computers and network equipment. According to this section small businesses should
not “allow unauthorized persons to have physical access to or to use any of your business computers”.
We specifically observed and interpreted this neutralization as one that presented a lack of awareness
and poor framing of the importance of access control. We see this as a primary reason this provision was
not followed. The need to implement requisite controls was therefore neutralized by the size of the
organizations. In terms of appropriating a measure for risk we interpreted and assigned this
neutralization as H = high risk, this is shown by Table 2.
Based on the discussions and interpretation in the previous sections, we were able to summarize the
NISTR policies pertinent to securing ICT for small business organizations and present them in the
format of Table 3. Table 3 attempts to answer the last research question regarding how neutralization
should be addressed in these contexts so the owners-managers are better placed to manage cybersecurity threats more effectively.
Implications for theory
The theory of neutralization introduced by Sykes and Matza (1957) suggest that correct action can be
‘neutralized’ by ‘turning off inner protests’. We have demonstrated that neutralization is not necessarily
confined in disciplines such as criminology but can be especially extended into the discipline of
information systems. In this work, the theory of neutralization provides an actual lens that presents
owners-managers as having applied neutralization in contexts to of managing information and cybersecurity threats. The contribution that this work brings is the application of the theory of neutralization
into the discipline of information systems security. From the theory of neutralization’s perspective,
owners-managers should therefore be constantly aware of their need to abide by good practice because
they have a fiduciary obligation to themselves and the businesses they run. Owners-managers should be
aware of how unwittingly problematic neutralization can be.
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Table 3: ‘We want to Do it Our Way’: Addressing neutralization
Values for
Information
Security

Back-up and
Storage

Manifestation of
Neutralization:
“We want to Do
it Our way”
Approach
“My
clerk
dropped
[the]
back up [disk]!
Now I cannot
restore and the
data is lost!”

Summary of interpretation

It remains easy for a manger to
‘pass-the-buck’ on employees
particularly if they fail to
correctly interpret their own
fiduciary responsibilities to the
business.
Section 2.5, NISTR 7621
It is important to consider
innovative ways to eliminate
‘password fatigue’.
Section 2.9, NISTR 7621

Mitigating Neutralization (Risk
identified in Table 2)
Why “We want to do it our Way”
is unwittingly problematic for a
good manager
A good manager should ensure that
the small business has policies that
not only address backing up data but
also how to recover the same data
when needed.

Password
complexity

“…We
started
with
passwords…but I
asked them to
remove…”

Secure
Online
Banking

“restricting
access to the
online banking”

A full ‘lock-down’ has never
worked as a security measure
and is often seen by employees
as counterproductive.
Section 3.4, NISTR 7621

A good manager should spot where
the small business is most vulnerable.
Consideration should be given to
value of online transactions and
targeted awareness training.

Policy
on
Phishing

“I haven’t spoken
to them about it
and if they are
stupid enough to
fall for it they
have to learn
from it.”
“…everybody has
access to the
information…the
business is so
small”

Employees may be unwittingly
manipulated to get them to
perform action that could harm
small businesses.
Section 2.8, 3.1, NISTR 7621

A good manager should ensure they
are conversant and continuously
updated with technical standards that
address the threat of phishing.

Small businesses tend to collect
personal data in less structured/
formalized ways. This creates
avenues for privacy violations
on personal data.
Section 2.10, NISTR 7621
It is important to consider risks
that could come from your own
staff because many security
incidents come from disgruntled
staff who could turn out to be
‘insider threat agents’.
Section 2.6, NISTR 7621

A good manager should ensure
compliance of privacy legislation
which deal with issues regarding how
to best treat personal data.

Storage of
Personal
Data

Access
control

“…if
my
employees
are
doing things on
their computers,
how would I
know?

A good manager should ensure that
information systems are protected
using strong passwords while equally
ensuring audit and regulatory
compliance.

A good manager should recognize
different types of employees, the
different types of potential incidents
that these employees could create and
how such incidents could evolve
overtime.

Implications for Practice
We note that neutralization may not be an ideal approach towards managing cyber-security risk in small
businesses operating in South Africa, specifically since many of the observed decision points suggested
by this study sample of owners-managers tend to be rationalized imperfectly. On the basis of the four
cases provided, such rationalization goes contrary to solid and good standards such as NISTIR 7621.
Neutralization may therefore be potentially detrimental particularly when actions constrain the proper
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adoptions of standards. We provide a framework notably in Table 3 above that would signify the
importance of managing detrimental neutralization and how decision points suggested could be
improved upon.
Generalization of Research
A critique of the approach used in this work is that it remains difficult to generalize the above findings
particularly since the four cases used might not necessarily be representative of many small businesses
across South Africa. Indeed Denzin (1983) has rejected the notion of generalization as a goal in
qualitative research and suggests that ‘every instance of social interaction, if thickly described represents
a slice from the life world’. Nevertheless it remains possible to generalize this work partly because of
the replicability of the findings across several populations if the same methods are used. If the same
methods can be applied elsewhere, it remains possible to assert that neutralization can be manifest
beyond these four cases. This idea is akin to Yin’s (2003:49-53) ‘Literal replication’ from a case study
research.

CONCLUSION
The work presents an insightful understanding on how neutralization as an outcome of existing values
held by owners-managers of small business within Gauteng, South Africa could create unintended
consequences of generating risk. We noted that neutralization served as antecedents to information
security risks. It is from such observation and work carried out that we have provided a conceptual
model that could guide owners-managers on how neutralization can be mitigated. The research work
provides new insight into the cognitive effects of neutralization to small IT-dependent business
organizations of Gauteng that would generate unintended consequences to the security of systems.
While this work is specific to the small business organizations of South Africa, a global debate of
various psycho-cognitive approaches to information security is to be encouraged. This work provided
such a platform.
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